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G O D  A M D  T H E  A B S O L U T E .
IHTBQDUCTIOH.
The special sciences are gradually widening the area 
of their investigation. Old assumptions are rigorously examined 
and certain terms, hitherto uncritically used, are acquiring a 
fuller and more precise connotation. Scientific thought, in 
many Instances, is thus passing the old-time conventional 
boundaries and is approaching or even entering the metaphysical. 
This expansion will yield a philosophy of nature which will make 
new oontacts or deepen existing ones with philosophy Itself to 
which will be presented the task of co-ordinating the philosophy 
of nature with the philosophy of spirit.
Theology* in its own way, has always done what the 
special sciences for their own purpose are beginning to do, viz. 
to reach a general ultimate conclusion. To elicit this implicit 
trespass is to clarify thought on religion. An utterly inarticu­
late religious experience would provide at most mere data for a i
science or philosophy. hut whenever religion in the general j
sense becomes articulate, be it only to declare "Allah is one” ]
j
or ”Jehovah is God” , it provides not only data but also, at 
least, implies an interpretation thereof that stands as a 
challenged or an endorsement to its scientific or philosophic 
equivalents. /in ]
1 Used merely to connote the science of the object of 
religious experience.
2.
In the articulation of this religious experience there 
are several grades which must be clearly discriminated. There 
Is first the Immediate, unofltlolsed utterances of faith such 
as we find In religious biography and confession. The grandeur 
of the content here by no means guarantees the accuracy of the 
forms of articulation. Further, the religious life may be 
examined and from It deductions may be made and the utterances 
referred to above may be collated and systematlsed so as to form 
a body of truth after the type of the special sciences. If the 
limitations of such a pursuit were strictly respected, there 
could be no conflict with any other special science or with 
philosophy Itself. Its limited validity and strength would lie 
In Its Internal coherence and effectiveness for its specific 
purpose. A third articulation would be reached (and aotually 
often Is reached) when a whole-world view Is expressed and upon 
the religious experience alone not a speolal science but a 
philosophy is grounded. It Is this articulation which Is 
challenged and Justly challenged. There may and must be many 
speolal sciences. Philosophy must be one. The religious ex-/ 
perlenoe Is one of many. Its specific contribution to truth 
Is only part of the whole truth of the universe. The unity 
which philosophy seeks can never be attained by the subordina­
tion of the deliverances of other realms to the dictation of 
religious testimony. The whole must judge every part. Much / 
confusion would be avoided if religion were aocepted as an ex­
perience
s.
perienoe suitable to be articulated into a speolal science but 
not by any means oomprebensiTe enough to be the exclusive data 
for a philosophy. This would confer rights as well as impose 
limitations. The biologist refuses to describe or define the 
processes, which he studies, by the categories supplied by 
mechanism. The theologian in like manner is entitled to use 
categories indigenous to the field he investigates. Ho purely 
biological processes could ever account for the religious ex­
perience. But so unique is the religious experience in its 
relation to the rest of experience that it seems to have an 
absolute of its own and so we find its object referred to as 
the creator of the world, the providential immanence, eto.
But this is trespassing in other fields. lor these are objects 
to which there are approaches and of which there are interprets* 
tions other than the religious one. God and the Absolute are 
both ultimates but each in a sense different from the other.
To oonslder the deeply involved contacts of these two ultimates
t is the purpose of thlB thesis.
THS BB1IGI0P3 JBXPKRIBHCB.
Religion, like philosophy, has its origin in experi­
ence. Philosophy starts with a mind knowing a vast concourse 
of objects and developes by cognising that concourse as a unity 
or world. Religion starts with a unique experience. If every 
deduction drawn from that experience were erroneous, the experi­
ence
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enoe would remain. It oan and muat be explained: it oannot be
repudiated. If the deduotlons drawn from that experlenoe laok
the logical ooherenoe and foroe of those found in a natural
solenoe, it oannot be disputed that the religious experience
itself is par excellence. So other experience can compare with
it in Intensity and character.
"Yea with one voice 0 world though thou deniest 
Stand thou on that side for on this am I".
Augustine says, "I know not how any rational demonstration of
God could satisfy me; for I do not believe I know anything as
l
I desire to know God". Newman speaks in the same faay "Starting 
then with the being of God (whloh as I have said is as certain
7.
to me as the certainty of my own being}". Whatever ultimate 
investigation may yield on this point, whether an unsuspected 
depth of one1s own self or an objective supreme being, here is 
data which oompared with the data of the speolal sciences is 
unique and overwhelming. It is not the merely given. It is 
the captivating. Inevitably only he who experiences it oan 
appreciate this data. Any analysis from another point of view, 
valuable and authoritative in its own realm though it be, is no 
substitute for or refutation of this experience.
In any experience, the self, like Wordsworth's cloud 
"moveth altogether if it move at all". But in the religious
/experience
1 3ol. 1. 2. 7.
^Apologia. 217. Everyman's Series.
The term "God" here appears. Hereinafter it will simply 
connote the object or the origin of the religious exper­
ience.
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experience the whole self Is more deeply involved than in any 
other experience. In extreme Instances there may be an 
emotional, a cognitive or a conative emphasis. hut that is 
exceptional and merely incidental. In religion the initial un­
rest is not due to an apparent contradiction eliciting a deeper 
analysis and synthesis. It is the birth pangs of a whole self 
"moving about in worlds not realised". Its satisfaction lies 
not merely in the attainment of logical coherence but in loving 
adoration and self-forgetful service as well. The religious 
experience comes not to destroy but fulfil a personality. 
Characteristics are not obliterated but sublimated. Hence in­
dividual religious experiences reveal a wide range of diversity. 
Nevertheless in religious experience, particularly of the higher 
kind, there are great unchanging universal characteristics.
The subject of this experienced finds relief from his 
deepest loneliness. He sees that his spiritual life is not 
enisled but annexed to an appropriate universe. He feels he is 
saved, saved from a helpless isolation: he enters a spiritual con­
text wherein his life finds a new anddeeper significance and pur­
pose. This inner adjustment may be variously interpreted according 
to past experience or contemporary thought but its essential 
character is at-one-ment. That outgoing instinctive craving of the
self finds an environment and, in correspondence with it,a satls-
/ faction
^iienoted hereafter by the term "saint".
6.
faction. This urge in Its highest reaoh seems to carry the 
▼ery self with it. Henoe its tragio intensity. Has it outdone 
itself, is it an audaoious Impertinence and is it to find the 
universe, so responsive to other modes of approach, to be a 
spiritual vacuum? Is this new emergence merely an orphan fact? 
The saint declares he has found it otherwise. The deep without 
has answered to the deep within.
This experience is not merely the discovery of a unity
s'
but is also an adoption into it. The life of the whole begins
to fill the part in a unique way. There is a new sense of
power. The narrow unsurrendered self does not appropriate this
Hr
power to devote*to its own selfish purposes. This power changes 
what it charges. The abstraot self in expanding with the life 
of the whole oomes more fully under the control of the whole.
The resultant experience is more than a mere inner ecstasy, more 
than a mere strengthening of the will; heart and mind are 
transformed too. So this experience has its trans-subjective 
effeots. The saint overcomes the world. The overcoming may 
have different modes in different saints or in the same saint 
at different times. flor the other-worldliness of the saint has 
varying relations to the so-called "this-world". It may be a 
flight from this world, a monastic or mystical exit. It may
accept this world astbesymbol, and its activities as the sacra­
ment , of the spiritual or other-world. It may also adopt this 
world as the means to its end. This world may be aooepted as
just the raw material to be Informed and fashioned by spiritual
/agency
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agenoy into the other-world. Diverse are the religious inter­
pretations of this world. But, as the saint accepts his world, 
and perhaps for his highest good at the time rightly accepts it, 
so he overcomes it. He lives an empowered life.
This is accompanied by a feeling of rest and security 
which is generally in some measure an immediate endowment and 
not the reward for a prolonged effort. This deep, calm, satis­
fying experience is frequently enjoyed before any analysis has 
been made. And when an analysis has been made it does not 
find the grounds of this rest and security in the unreality of 
the human failure or in the inevitability of human suooess.
That would give to the self a prominence that does not belong to 
it in religious experience.
"Hot what I am but what 0 Lord Thou art 
That that alone oan be the soul's true rest".
The philosopher confidently tackles an apparently recalcitrant
fact not because it necessarily reveals the promise of capitula­
tion to an ascertained unity but because the unity so far ascer­
tained inspires him with the hope that all is a unity. The 
saint's rest comes not from the discovery of anything hitherto 
unsuspected in himself but rather because he has found that his 
spiritual nature is not wandering in an inhospitable universe 
but has a home, and that in God. This rest lay not in what he 
would be but in what One already was - an actual present fact.
In the immediate religious ecstasy neither the failure nor suc­
cess of the self is; God is all and in all. When the emotional
/intensity
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intensity yields its cognitive implications or oonative applica­
tions, or both, the saint’s rest is still in what God is and in 
what God achieves through His servants* agency. There is an 
Inward harmony deeper, richer, more possessive than the satis­
faction given by achievement in any other department of experience. 
Without assuming anything with regard to the objective
reality of the source of this experience, we can analyse a little
• \
what seems thus to appear to the saint. Every genuine experi­
ence yields an ultimate. That is not something merely deduced 
but something that subdues and captivates. There the ultimate 
is consciously felt as the Alpha as well as the Omega of experi-
enoe. The source of this experience moves the saint to awe.
\
This has a unique quality. The term "fear” without qualifica­
tion does not connote it. The fear of God is something quite 
distinct. The terror that a physical monstrosity oan create 
is far removed from it. The latter lacks the intimate and per­
sonal grip the former brings. This, in the riper religious 
experience, is often sublimated but never eliminated. Yet this 
awe is accompanied by a fascination. The saint is held in its 
superb spell. Whether this is felt immediately as in a mystic 
rapture or mediately through a religious ministry, its incom­
parable grandeur is unquestionable. It is also the same whether 
God oomes as the contrast in an ideal which humbles the saint or 
as a grace which raises and exalts him. And this object so 
beautiful and awe-inspiring is one of measureless power. In His
/presence
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presence the saint feels weak and worthless. It is power that 
is akin to the religious experience. Whether it of itself can
J1 V - V - v  .. V 'v *. - . - .V '  1 yIt
yield a /general omnipotence or omnipresence is at least doubtful. 
These things at the moment are not in the saints consciousness. 
The overwhelmingness of the object of religious experience has 
an omnipotence and omnipresence of its own kind. But this 
should not be transported from its own field of reference to 
another without at least a recognition of the consequent change 
in connotation that must have automatically taken place. Above 
all this object of religious experience is one of worth. It 
produces primarily not intellectual investigation nor practical 
activity but adoration. The characteristic attitude before it 
is worship. The non-self that confronts the self in religious 
experience is always higher than the self.
h
THE DISTINCTNESS Qg THE RELIGIOUS BXPERIEKQB.
The term "religion” is not a mere synonym for some­
thing else and the experience it connotes is not a mere aspeot 
of some wider experience, f Theology is as distinct a science 
as chemistry or biology and its data is as homogeneous as that 
of other sciences. Yet the relation of religious experience 
to the rest differs from that of any other to its fellows. It 
is not one among the many but something that may fill and trans­
form the rest. It does not supplement the kingdoms of this 
world but endeavours to make them constituents of its own.
/There
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There is nothing a man oan do that oannot he done religiously 
or irreligiously. As Bosanquet says a man may even "sin 
religiously”. Yet this ubiquity of the religious experience 
does not involve that religion is resolvable into something 
else. Like philosophy, it seeks an ultimate. Yet it is 
not the "metaphysios of the vulgar". One sees, in suoh 
philosopher saints as Augustine, Plotinus and Eokhart, the 
saint seeking and, to some extent, finding a God of great and 
attraotive fulness and the philosopher oonoluding on an Absolute 
exceedingly empty or abstract. Heither interest was weak enough 
to be suppressed by the other and eaoh was so distinct from the 
other as to prevent capitulation in either direction. The 
religious apprehension is^ui generis;. The saint's interpre­
tation of it may be inaccurate but he will resent a complete 
denial of its reality or a resolution of it into something else. 
For the religious attitude is quite distinct from the philoso­
phic. Anything, "flower in the crannied wall" etc. will yield 
to ultimate research an absolute. Yet nothing merely so 
Investigated will yield the God of religious experience.
Franols Thompson could not find God though he descended "the 
labyrinthine ways of my own mind" and "troubled the gold gate­
ways of the stars". Yet these all proclaimed a unity, even a 
oneness of purpose. Thompson consciously beset behind, before 
and within with the Absolute confesses that in a sense he wants
more, A change of attitude is adopted - "Haked I wait thy
/love1s
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love's uplifted stroke" and without cognising another fact, he 
enjoys a deep, satisfying experience. In the absence of this 
attitude "neither in this mountain nor in that" will the 
religious experience be enjoyed. The object of the religious 
experience awes, elates and transforms the saint. The philoso­
pher would not be less a philosopher, did not the Absolute do 
that for him. The Absolute is the goal of a purely intellec­
tual search. God is the object of a personal quest we will 
name provisionally "faith". The philosopher must find unity 
whether personality is found or not. The saint, with certain 
exceptions, mu3t find a personal objective whether unity be 
found or not.
And religion is as distinct from morality as it is 
from philosophy. If the moral quest is subsumed by religion 
it is transformed in the subsumption. Bellgion is not the 
handmaid of morality to bring success where failure would other­
wise be inevitable. The confessions of Paul, Augustine, Bunyan, 
Wesley, etc. may be interpreted to imply that their great endeav­
our prior to conversion was to keep the law. > This is partly if 
not wholly wrong. Had they kept the law to the last jot or 
tittle without finding God^their anguish would not have been 
appeased. The inadequacy of morality for the religious aspirant 
is revealed as much in the moral sucoesses as in the moral fail­
ures of such persons. It is often said that Paul's conversion 
turned his moral failures into successes. It would be equally 
true at least to say that it turned his moral sucoesses into
/failures
failures. . The fact that he was "touching the righteousness which 
is in the law blameless"Appeared to him after his conversion, as 
"dung". The aspirant after eternal life was not seeking a power 
that could turn a moral failure into a success. "All these things 
have I kept." He was seeking a satisfaction no moral success could 
give. Whether there is 3uoh a thing as mere morality and if so, 
whether there is a type of person to whom it yields an adequate 
satisfaction^is not in question. What is obvious is that it is not 
a substitute for or an equivalent to religion. Were a saint's 
moral conduct to coinoide outwardly with that of a moralist the 
significance of the saint's conduct for himself would be vastly 
different from that of the moralist's conduct for himself. Religion 
/is a distinct and autonomous approach to reality. Rudolf Otto3 
endeavours to keep the distinct nature of religion clear but he 
seems to consider as essential to that its separation from every 
other interest. He declares that to moralise or rationalise 
religion is to weaken, distort and mortify it. But while religion 
oan never be Interpreted in terms of something else it should and 
oan fill everything else.
nevertheless, although religion has its peculiar ubiquity 
and reaches an ultimate of its own kind, the science of religion is 
only one among many. It is one of the several approaches to 
reality. Its approach to its object can on the one hand be immed­
iate as in my8tic communion or on the other hand mediate as in the
/transformation
1Philippians 3.V.6. 2Matt. 19.V.20.
3 "The Idea of the Holy".
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transformation of "the menial round and the common task". How­
ever religiously a specialist may make another approach to reality
that approach still remains distinct and its finding authoritative 
in its own field, e.g. religion should make a scientific investi­
gator more scientific rather than less and should drive him to a 
conclusion freest from all prejudice even so-oalled religious 
prejudice. At the same time that would not annihilate the 
religious approaoh and conclusion. If the conclusions conflict 
no one has power to cancel the other. Bach must keep to its own 
terms of reference. Only philosophy then oan adequately 
adjudicate.
RBAL1TY Of THB OBJBOT 0? RELIGIOUS EXPgRIBgQB.
Underlying this contention is the assumption that real 
religion oannot be separated from man's ontological consciousness. 
The saint believes in the trans-subjeotive reality of the object 
of his religious experience. His most characteristic act, 
worship, is, of all men's acts, the most incongruous, if rendered 
merely to one's self or to the objectifications of that self. He 
may be wrong in his conception of what he worships, and wrong 
through not knowing all that the self is, but such is his faith.
/ Religious experience seems to him to bring him into the presence 
of a non-self that is higher than the self. Ho dogmatic assump­
tion need here be made about the line of demarcation between the 
self and the non-self nor concerning its immobility or permanence.
/But
hut the fuller surrender of the saint to the object of his 
religiouB experfence never leads to any confusion about the 
reality bath of the self and of its object. A one-sided extrava- 
gant: mysticism may lose the self in God but by no process, that 
oan the least be called religious, oan God be resolved into 
the self.
In all experience of the world we are conscious of 
something which is not the consciousness itself. There are 
extra-conscious conditions of our knowledge, viz. what in fact 
we mean by the phrase "the objects themselves". Is the object 
of religion equally real? The extra-conscious conditions of 
religious experience are certainly what may be called sub­
conscious. hut are they wholly so? It may be observed at once 
that if the term "self" must be made to denote, beside much else, 
God as the objeot of the religious experience, then the conno­
tation of the term must undergo a transforming expansion and to 
the normal conscious self one of its greatest objects would be 
simply its own religious objectification. It would contain 
within itself its most completely "other". hut this is a con­
clusion which, were it substantiated in other ways, psychology 
is prevented from reaching legitimately by the limitations in­
evitable to its nature. It deals with mental states as such 
and a certain mental state could noY more be God to the saint 
than a perception of a table could be a table to the ordinary
/percipient.
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percipient. To accept, as psychology bids u b , the Idea of God 
as a projection of our consciousness and prayer as a mode of 
auto-suggestion is not to deny the reality of God and prayer.
It only indioates that the religious consciousness works through 
the same agencies as our consciousness of the external world 
does. £ut of all the contents of the religious consciousness 
revealed by psychical analysis nothing could be more obvious 
than the saint's conviction of the reality of God and of his 
intercourse with Him. If it were conclusively proved to the 
saint that his religion was only a happy and effective delusion, 
his faith and his whole religious life would ultimately wither 
away. Psychology will enable the saint in many instances to 
separate the temporal from the eternal and the contingent from 
the necessary but it is not psychology that oan deny or affirm 
the ontological validity of a belief in God. A saint who 
happened at the same time to be a psychologist would emphatically 
assert that what in the religious experience he analysed as a 
psychologist was not what he as a saint enjoyed. The former 
is to the latter only what the vibrations in the lumlnlferous 
ether are to the lovely panorama, jsay^ which produced them.
And this view oannot be shaken by the increasing emphasis placed 
on the unoonsoious without also every view which is opposed to 
it being equally shaken. Give the unconscious complete control, 




The world of objective reality so great and rioh ad­
mits of many methods of approach and intercourse. There are 
partially unified realms of experience each corresponding to 
different worlds within objective reality. Religion oannot, 
therefore, be suspected if it has an approach to and intercourse 
with objective reality peculiar to itself. The admissibility 
of many approaches does not justify a man in drawing a bow at a 
venture. .but should he do so, intercourse with reality would j 
inform, refine and discipline the approach. One of the charac­
teristic features of the religious experience is that its approach 
is to an invisible, a non-sensuous objeotive reality. hut if 
this invalidates the ontological value of the objeot of the 
religious experience, more than that is invalidated^for art and 
morality really deal with the non-sensuous. They like religion 
are really the saoraments of the sensuously invisible. Moreover 
only in experience can the defects of experience be rectified
i
and it8 delusions shattered. Srror or fault in our approach 
to objective reality will be eliminated only by continuous inter-
■ icourse with that reality. Therein one notices that religion \ 
oan claim the same ultimate grounds for the reality of the object 
of its experience as other departments of experience oan respec­
tively for the reality of their objeot, e.g. art, science and I
i
morality. In its objeotive one finds universality. ^
Religion comes not to destroy but to fulfil personal­
ities. It eliminates no diversities of character and conduct
save such as are regarded as sinful. Yet when due allowance has
/been
17.
"been made for time and place, its universal nature is clearly 
cognisable. "All the saints agree" says Dean Inget i.e. all the 
saints as saints. Religious like any other feeling is private 
but God is not. Priesthoods and sects have claimed a oertain 
monopoly of God. hut the history of religion shows that the only 
monopoly, if the phraso must be used, like the monopoly of the 
objeot of any other experience, is in the hands of the right 
approaoh. Reality imposes conditions of successful or real inter­
course. That part of it known as the objeot of religious experi- 
, enoe is no less exaotlng although its appeal is so comprehensive. 
It is imperative in other experiences to "use only the categories 
which have been found by fullest experience to be adequate to the 
subject matter in hand". Religion oannot be less Imperative.
"How oan I tell you or how ye believe him 
How till he bring you where I have been,"2'
i.e. in the experience. Religion oannot claim exemption from
ordinary logical analysis and provide tests of its own. Rut
whatever unique characteristics logical analysis may elicit
4
within the distinctive field of religious experience, these must 
be accepted as valid as those elicited by the same analysis in 
other fields of experience. To read the devotions of the saints, 
to observe their character and conduct, to study the psychology 
of religious experience is not to approaoh God as the object of 
religious experience. But for those who make the right
/approach
1 Visoount Haldane. Contemporary British Philosophy, p.142. 
a Hyar'a "St. Paul."
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approaoh the objeot is always there, a real universal. One of 
the meanings of the word "righteousness” as applied to God in 
the Old Testament is faithfulness. He would remain true at all 
times and In all plaoes. The diversities in the articulation 
and application of religion do not militate against this 
assumption. The more medlateness is reduced, as in mysticism, 
the more is the harmony revealed. The mystic of the East and 
the mystic of the Vest differ but little in religious essentials. 
The manifold embodiments of the religious life are of supreme 
practical religious importance and should not confuse the mind 
of those who accept religion as the transforming power of all 
llfer^ Smile houtreaux says that James eliminates "from the 
essence of religion all that is objective, intellectual and un­
practical in the material sense and that oan be transferred from
4
individual to individual for instance dogmas, rites, traditions". 
The essenoe of religion truly oannot be transferred from individ­
ual to individual - and need not be - for religion must be a 
personal discovery. let what is discovered is never a private 
affair; the experience is not merely that suoh a thing happened 
to me, but that suoh is and oan "be perceived by anybody endowed 
with normal sense and intellect who observes phenomena in those 
conditions wherein it is offered to me now",^
In any department of thought, a deepening intercourse
/with
^"Science and Religion", p.333. 
i^ o. do. p.333.
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with reality reveals the categories by which It oan be compre­
hended and the modes of most effeotive approach. Religion is 
no exception to this. Religious experience is a great discip­
line, and as it developes the necessity involved therein becomes 
more and more obvious and the objeot increasingly corrects all 
subjective delusion. "God is not man that he should liej 
neither the son of man, that he should repent” ^ however ardently 
man may wish that He would. The increasing committal of the 
self to the object of religious experience makes clearer the 
reality of that objeot and its distinctness from the self. There 
is order in the real religious life. The reality to which it 
responds increasingly reveals and imparts Itself as what is 
already revealed is honored and what is already offered is ac­
cepted. Svelyn Underhill notes that religious experience brings 
"a progressive purity of vision, a progressive sense of assurance, 
an ever Increasing delicacy of moral discrimination and demand”.2.
Thus the way in which the saint concludes or may con­
clude regarding the objeotive order with which he corresponds is 
not essentially different from the processes of thought by 
which we come to believe in the reality of the objeotive world.
We cannot get outside of the knowledge of a fact to see if that 
knowledge corresponds to the fact as it is when it is not 
cognised. We oan correct experience only by experience and
/within
^ Kumbers 23, v.19.
2,"Life of the Spirit", p.170.
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within experience. The increasing enlargement, the progressive 
self illumination, the growing systemisation of a genuine 
/ religious experience indioate0 the fruitful influence of objective 
reality.
Interpreting God as the ohjeot of religious experience, 
we must still not straightway assume that we can have anything 
corresponding to a science of religion or that if it were possible, 
it would be anything but prejudicial to real religion. Otto 
while contending strongly for the uniqueness of the religious 
experience, protests against ita being subject to "sohematisation". 
He denotes the unique element in religious experience by the 
term "numinous” and makes it in his treatment to appear as a 
religious "thing in itself". "It is salutary” he says, "that 
we should be incited to notice that religion is not exclusively 
oontained nor exhaustively comprised in any series of rational 
assertions".1 Is any experience, we may ask. Hut what is not 
oontained in a rational assertion concerning the religious ox 
any other experience is surely not something irrational. Otto 
labours to establish the "wholly other” character of the reli­
gious experience and so save it from confusion with any other, 
e.g. morality or philosophy. Hut does suoh distinctiveness 
require the irrational? Curiously enough he traoes a distinc­
tive development in the "numinous”. "The * daemonic dread’, after 
itself passing through various gradations, rises to the level of
/’fear
1 "The Idea of the Holy”, p.4.
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1
■fear of the gods* , and thenoe to *fear of God*". The 
"numinous" thus Beems to oarry a latent rationality. Moreover, 
a completely pure immediacy would be almost, if not wholly. 
Incomprehensible to us. The extreme mystic who endeavours to 
strip our conception of God bare of all image and metaphor finds 
that he renders himself almost dumb concerning his religious 
experience. At the same time it is necessary to recognise that 
ordinary religious confession is inevitably full of metaphor and 
must not be accepted as a scientific or philosophic statement.
Ve must further recognise that the elucidation and systemlsatlon 
of what is given in the religious experience ie not an equivalent 
for the experience Itself, The science may seem to miss out 
something the poet and lover feel but that is inevitable not 
because that something is Irrational but because the science of 
it is not the experience of it. It would be easy to dispose of 
God by describing the ground of the "numinous" as the great 
unsearchable, hut religion Itself would suffer most. Religious 
experience rightly Interpreted cries for rt8ohematl8ation,,• The 
saint very firmly believes in the real existence of God but to 
put the experience "out of bounds" to rational investigation is 
to preclude the very process by which the ontological validity 
of belief in God could be established. This prohibition would 
prevent the elimination of the contingent from the neoessary and
/the
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the elucidation of a synthesis underlying such immediate utter­
ances of faith as are Incoherent or contradictory In themselves. 
There must be selection and valuation but selection and valuation 
by principles germain to the religious sphere.
There, as elsewhere, it must be recognised that the 
last fact has not been incorporated. faith must ever be what 
Sir Henry Jones called It "a hypothesis on trial1*: "We know In
part1*. 1 3van the apparent disharmony between theology and 
science may be due not only to the inherent differences of the 
fields they respectively work In but also to the fact that final­
ity has been nowhere yet attained. The development which 
theology Itself shows proves that any partioular theology oan be 
only a tentative approximation towards the truth concerning God.
The graver question is, oan there be a science of 
religious experience. A.H.Whitehead says that nature for the 
scientist Is closed to "moral and aesthetic values whose appre­
hension is vivid in proportion to self-conscious activity". This 
has to be understood in the light of his definition of nature 
whloh he desorlbes as that "which we observe In perception through 
the senses". This inevitably would make a science of religious 
experience very different from the physical sciences. God Is 
not perceived through the senses. The sciences differ too one 
from the other in degrees of precision. Professor J.A.Thomson 
says, "It is no reproach to biology, psychology and sociology to
/o&ll
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1 1. Cor. 13. v.9.
Ofcill them 'inexact' sciences; they are limited by the complexity 
of the material and by the emergencies of such 'imponderables' as
A
intelligence”. Theology therefore may be the most inexact 
science. Yet no realm has laws more inviolable than those of 
religion. "Heaven and earth shall pass away, but my words shall 
not pass away”.2. Thus having its laws it is capable of
systemisation. The results of this must be presented with the
results of scientific research in other fields and it is the task 
of philosophy to elicit the underlying unity. If religion yields 
something the others have not yielded that peculiar contribution 
must not be rejected merely on account of its uniqueness, 
especially if it implies the rejection of the higher by the lower. 
At the same time the higher never repudiates the lower however
much it may subsume and transcend it.
1




Ve now pass from examining exclusively the religious 
experience as such to its deliverances in relation to the wider 
context in which it stands. The religious experience could be 
desorlbed as a unique relationship with the Absolute. But many 
a non-religious experience could be so described. The religious 
relationship is not with the Absolute in general as such and cer­
tainly not with something or someone outwlth the Absolute but 
with one who is named God. Every genuine saint would affirm, 
however much he appreciated other experiences, that this was the 
highest. To Interpret this in terms of lower experiences would 
be to exclude its most characteristic features. What by this
I
act he finds the Absolute or God to be Is something not found by 
any non-religious act. Religious faith finds in God that which 
gives a congruous acceptance and response. The relationship 
thus established finds its nearest (nevertheless actually remote) 
analogy in the highest personal fellowship between human beings. 
What religion really requires theoretically is not that God of 
the Absolute should be defined as a person - that is a matter of
/terminology
* Footnote. The difference between these two terms is not 
here clearly stated and they are also used somewhat 
loosely as it is felt inadvisable to anticipate here much 
of the Conclusionv In which these terms will be more 
strictly defined.
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terminology - but that this relationship should be aooepted as 
being not a plou3 soliloquy of the soul but a genuine oommunlon 
of the soul with God. In the religious experience the saint 
does not feel he Is harnessing a passive power. God Is never 
discovered In spite of Himself; However passionate and for long 
unsuccessful the quest of the saint may have been, what he does 
find In the satisfying experience Is One who had been seeking all 
the time. The saint ought readily to grant that this experience 
far transcends what he experiences In the highest transports of 
human fellowship. Yet he would Insist that the best or essential 
characteristics of the latter are subsumed and not destroyed In 
the former. All that absolutism demands concerning the supra- 
personal as such Is In oontradiotion with nothing that religion 
yields. There Is, of course. In the actual experience a warmth 
and an Intimacy that seem entirely to elude all philosophic 
phraseology. hut much of the content of that experience Is never 
found In any fellowship with a human being. Hence religious 
experience itself indicates that to describe this relationship as 
personal is very Inadequate although perhaps of all available 
descriptions It is the least Inadequate. Professor Mulrhead 
suggested to C.C.J.Webb that the personal relationship with God 
or the Absolute may not be the fixed and final form beyond which 
there oan be no further development. As religion would not 
allow lower kinds of experience to declare "Thou shall have no 
higher categories than mine", religion Itself cannot justly utter
/ the
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the same dictum. the oracial point is that religion pro­
bably suffers more from inadequate metaphors and categories than 
any other experience and it certainly is the experience that 
seems most open to development if not transcendence. There is 
in the experience nothing of the nature of a final limit but 
what is of most practical concern is the elucidation of what is 
now involved in the ejqperience and at present our categories 
yield a very inadequate articulation. This must involve a 
tentativeness and reservation in any decision on a personal Sod 
or personality in the Absolute. It may mean e.g. that if the 
characteristics of human personality were not logically attribu­
table to God or the Absolute, religion would not thereby in­
evitably suffer because the inapplicability might be due to God 
or the Absolute being more rather than less than personal.
Philosophy seeks an intellectual satisfaction which 
can be found only in an all-comprehensive unity. Religion 
offers in most oases a fellowship with what, with the above 
reservations, we will call a personal God. Can the unity de­
sired by philosophy be personal? Ve shall observe first how 
the analogy of human personality holds good for God or the 
Absolute and then how it breaks down in the wider application.
Ve note there is no unity so Intense as personality and personal­
ity deepens as its content is unified and its unity is expanded. 
"There is nothing" says Sir Henry Jones "save self-consciousness 




difference”. But can the Infinite be self-conscious? It needs 
to be noted that we know of no self-conscious being that la 
merely finite. Man la finite and more. Ve need not assume 
man can ever "be the Absolute" any more than the part can ever 
be It8 embracing whole. nut what limits otherwise can be put 
to the human self? What remote constituent cannot come within 
his comprehension? Vhat member of the human family can be 
ultimately Indifferent and Impervious to the rest? Vhat limits 
oan be put to the saint's Increasing incorporation of God - an 
incorporation which intensifies and enriches rather than dis­
solves personality? Thus great caution needs to be exercised 
in the use of the term supra-personal when It connotes a region 
of life beyond the personal. For what are the limits of that 
which we call personal? As the spiritual Is the natural at its 
best, so may the supra-personal be only the personal at its 
highest.
Further,"Ve belong to reality, as reality does not be­
long to us" and the human self oan find in that reality a non­
self such asGod or the Absolute cannot find. • "Vo non-self no 
self" we say. Is that true of God? If so, what oan be His non­
self? Ve note that the line between the human self and its non­
self at any given time Is not a fixed and final demarcation. In
what Is at that time his non-self lies the oontent of his original
/potential
1 "A Faith that Enquires", p.321.
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potential self. The self grows by the gradual reduction of the 
non-self to the self. The being which held all in its being 
would not thereby be inevitably impersonal. Moreover, although 
that gradual reduction of the non-self to the self is a condition 
of the creation of a human personality, it is not logically in­
evitable that an eternal personal absolute would require the 
same conditions. However, we do not desire to make a temporal 
retreat to an acosmic deity or argue away to a divine solipsist.
We oan hardly think that the evolution of the worlds oan be to 
the Absolute nothing more them the actions of our Involuntary 
organs are to us. hut it is not there that one would look for 
an equivalent to what we eaqperienoe as a non-self. Personality 
as we know it implies purpose, an ideal hovering over a discrepant 
reality. We cannot suggest that the physical world as such is 
other than what the Absolute would have it to be. hut the view 
of man given in the preceding chapter does allow for such a 
discrepancy. There is nofc question of man being in the Absolute. 
It is a question of mode. The nail driven into the vine may be 
as securely there as the healthy branch. hut the mode of its 
inclusion is different. Human experience is a realm where 
readjustment within the Absolute is not only possible but desir­
able. Self-transcendence, as hosanquet admits, may take two 
directions and God is concerned about the right direction being 
taken. Where the wrong direction has been taken, there God's 
will is not done on earth as it is in heaven. The mode of
/inclusion
inclusion is not as the Absolute desires or as the whole demands.
So that reoaloltrant part offers to the whole something which 
presents not only a task but what to the Absolute would be some­
what equivalent to what we know as a non-self. This may sound 
like an argument that would do more than was required of it, viz. 
prove that our perfection would depersonalise God. It may seem 
to suggest that human imperfections provide God with the conditions 
of personality. It oould be pointed out that it is possible that 
there will always be somewhere Imperfect human beings. hut the 
assumptions underlying the statement above need not be granted. 
Whether the finite Individual will ever reach a state of static 
perfection is to be questioned. Moreover the spiritual improve­
ment of a society instead of reducing rather increases the capa­
city of the individual for serving others and being served by 
them. Improvement multiplies and refines purpose. God cannot 
be considered as sxoluded from rendering greater service. So a 
heaven, far from eliminating, would rather heighten purpose and 
therefore the oonditlons of personality. So far the analogy 
between the human and the divine personality may hold.
nut in other respects the analogy needs to be reversed. 
Man'8 non-self offers to him his complete self. God offers 
Himself to His non-self, viz. humanity. It is man's ideal self |
i
embodied potentially in his non-self that should dominate him.
i
It is God's actual self that should and does endeavour to dominate 
His non-self. This non-self, viz. humanity, is posited by the
/Divine j
so.
Divine self as we did not posit our non-selves. This non-self 
to God is merely potential manhood. More could not he posited
by God. lor God cannot give goodness ready-made or manhood as
an endowment. Here, then, is limitation not from without but 
from within, a limitation that does not bind the finite but
inheres within the infinite. Here too is a non-self even for
God. out while the content of our self has to be acquired from 
a non-self, God's personality has simply to be maintained in or 
imparted to His non-self.
It may, however, be asked, oan we speak of a non-self
that is self-posited. Would not such a non-self be simply a
mirror in which the self saw itself and thus God’s communion with
i
us would be simply His soliloquy in the presence of His own !
reflection. That would be so, were the assumptions of some
types of Absolutism granted. Jiut this may not be necessary. For
it is self-hood He is positing which in time will become partly
distinctive and self-determined individuality. Moreover, "The 
higher we rise in the scale of subject-matter within which the 
will is exercised, the more persistently does freedom enter into 
the end that is willed and form an essential element in it".1' }
This positing, however, must be considered not as a 
temporal but as an eternal act. We cannot think of God waiting 
half an eternity before doing what He knew to be good. For we 
should have otherwise to believe that something outside of God j
/made
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made suoh an end possible <?r desirable or both. The eternal 
aot referred to does not necessarily imply the eternal existence 
of a humanity upon this world or some other. God's non-self 
may have been found in other orders of being prior to man. More­
over, God is not necessarily a bare simplicity. The Christian 
utterances of faith give us a God who is a triunity. This 
deliverance was made not in any theoretical interest but merely 
as an honest transcript of a rich and thrilling experience.
This much, however, was certainly implied that in the Godhead 
there was a unity that was not a bare simplicity and a wealth of 
personal life that did not impair that unity.
THB WORLD.
We have endeavoured to establish the distlnotiveness of 
the religious experience and the reality of the object of that 
experience. Between this object and the saint a relationship is 
developed which has the moral exaltation and spiritual delight of 
the highest human fellowship - and more. In the world, however, 
this meets with much that is indifferent, if not antagonistic to 
it. The emergence of the personal element, especially in its 
religious manifestations, while adding to the rich diversity of 
the world seems to threaten its unity. It is, therefore, assert­
ed sometimes that religion implies, if it does not demand, a 
pluralism that the spiritual and the natural constitute a 
dualism or that only a state of benevolent neutrality exists
/between
between God and the Absolute.
It must be noted that the term "world" here, to do 
justioe to the religious conception, must denote all that we ex­
perience save that for which human agency oan be accounted res­
ponsible. The confessions of the saint abound in references 
which imply that his spiritual life is deeply involved in the 
physical world. Here it is very essential to distinguish between 
the contingent and the necessary. The saint often speaks of his
gratitude for "temporal mercies". Dependence is a Characteristic
of saintliness. But dependence for physical benefits is not an 
exclusive or necessary religious attitude, as Rudolf Otto has
l
clearly shown in his references to Sohleiermaoher. The attitude 
can be maintained when that dependence seems to be betrayed.
"Though the fig tree shall not blossom neither shall fruit be in
the vine........  Yet will I rejoice in the Lord, I will joy in
the God of my salvation". If there is anything distinctive in 
that dependence it is due to the general religious attitude which 
influences but does not negate the non-religious attitudes. What 
is the distinctively religious attitude of dependence is reliance 
upon God for spiritual sustenance. In the light of this fact one 
of the defects of the traditional arguments for God becomes 
obvious. The inadequacy lies not merely in the fact that the con­
clusions contain more than the premises hold but that so far as
/they
1 "The Idea of the Holy", pp.flff.
2 Habakkuk 3, v.17-19.
33.
they are supposed to prove the existence of God as the object of 
religious experience the conclusions are presumed to hold some­
thing entirely different from what the premises contained. The 
contingency of the physical world is not necessarily an argument 
for the existence of the source of religious experience. Thus 
oreation may be a useful religious metaphor but not a logioal 
necessity of the religious experience. A similar argument must 
be applied to the claim for "interventionUl Here we have first 
to ask what are the facts that are supposed to imply interventions 
and what is the complete order that is supposed to be subject to 
intervention? Criticism and theology are still speaking on this 
point with an uncertain voice. Assuming for example's sake that 
some of the Hew Testament miracles did happen, we have yet to 
asoertain whether there is not a realm of law which is at present 
unapprehended but with which they are perfectly harmonious. The 
united voice of all the sciences cannot yet answer Carlyle's 
question "What the complete statute book of nature may possibly 
be?" To a world of mere meohanlsm the advent of teldology would 
appear as an intervention. But that would be an intervention 
which would subsume rather than negate the lower realm of 
meohanlsm. In like manner the Intervention of religion must 
/ subsume mechanism and telftology and not negate them. Thus 
intervention, if we may use the dubious term, suspends no law 
but reveals laws other than those already apprehended. Heal 
religion is not fettered by natural law nor substantiated by any
/violation
• * *
violation of it. The religious experience must hear its own 
credentials and upon those credentials alone the supreme Teacher 
sought to ground the faith of His followers. The demand for a 
sign was a weakness. The saint cannot religiously demand nor he 
religiously benefited by spectacular disorders, fantastic novel­
ties or physical compulsions. The Absolute does not contradict 
itself; one sphere of reference is not antagonistic to another. 
The lower cannot bind the whole universe to its limitations.
And what in religious experience is oailed intervention, in 
telsology would be called discovery or in meohanlsm, invention. 
The unique connotation o f  intervention" comes from its sphere of 
referenoe. In other spheres the object of our quest seems 
passive. It await8 experiment and observation. In religion 
the objeot seems active. What the religious aspirant finds is
One who all along has been seeking. "Ye have not chosen me; I
1
have chosen you". Thus religious achievement may be more con­
veniently denoted by the term "intervention" than by the terms 
"discovery" or "invention". And this intervention is in and 
through the saint's experience. To all else "winds blow and 
waters roll" as of old. Such things in themselves (if the 
abstraction oan be pardoned') are not modified nor do they violate 
their nature but the experiencing soul is modified and in the 
light and the power of its change "all things are made new". The 




indifferent diffusion. Philosophy speaks of grades of reality 
and religion speaks of a grade in the making, a realm where the 
operation of that spirit is oontingent on the oo-operation of man. 
But this involves a later chapter.
Religion, then, brings no violation of laws in lower 
realms but that does not leave it Isolated from the physical 
world. It is charged with and accepts a cosmic responsibility.
A good God and a bad world are said to be contradictory. Before 
we ask, oan the assumed contradiction be overcome, we ought to ask, 
is it obligatory on the part of religion to try to overcome it. 
According to the assumptions underlying this thesis, this involves 
the question, oan one sphere of referenoe be responsible for 
another? We do not ask meohanlsm to explain what may not be 
agreeable to us in chemistry. Should religion, then, be asked to 
explain or justify, say, an earthquake? A solution to this prob­
lem is sometimes sought in the theory of a finite God. But this 
is often presented in a way that would Isolate religion from 
other spheres of referenoe and tacitly if not openly would deny 
the Absolute. This, to say the least, is not in harmony with 
the testimony of the saints. The "sovereignty of God" is more 
than a pious hyperbole. On the other hand if by flnltude is 
meant the inability to deny Himself then God is inevitably finite 
to that extent. Moreover, it is a religious infinitude which 
the religious experience yields. That must be its distinctive 
contribution to a synoptic view of the world. And it may be
/questioned
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questioned whether religion in its own sphere of referenoe oan 
require or find more. There is nothing in the physical universe 
that oan defeat the religious purpose; nothing oan separate the 
saint from the objeot of his faith.
This discrimination is not made as if responsibility 
for the world is something prejudicial to religion. Moral evil 
will be dealt with later and consequently, implicitly or explicit­
ly, also the physical ills which are due directly or indirectly to 
man's abuse or misuse of nature. The appearance of waste may be 
unjustifiable in Itself. Yet it is difficult to see how nature 
could work without large reserves. Anthropomorphism needs to be 
avoided as much in relation to orders lower than man as in rela­
tion to those above him. The struggle, the suffering and the 
death which we witness in nature must mean for the non-human 
subjects something entirely different from what they mean for us. 
They are not sufficient to justify us in oalling the world bad.
And one oannot ignore the positive gains that aoorue from the 
struggle itself. Much of the sting of physical evil is with­
drawn when it is seen that such evil may serve higher ends. What 
lovely ministries, what qualities of character it has drawn forth! 
And pain itself is nature's red danger signal. We must also 
guard against anthropomorphism in the higher direction. There 
oan be in God no indulgence, no concession to our lower desires. 
The goodness which we anticipate in Him is not necessarily what 
would please us in our states of imperfection nor oan it support
/any
37.
any hedonistic test as applied in this connection. Moreover, 
psycho-therapeutics is increasingly suggesting that the ills of 
life may not mark the limitations of man but are only the con­
sequences of his ignorance or lethargy or both. The physical 
world is surely physically good and more than that should not be 
expected.
hut oan the responsibility for the world be imputed to 
the objeot of only one of the many approaches to reality? In 
doing so, would not one be charging a part with the responsibility 
of the whole? On what does the saint ground his belief in the 
sovereignty of God? Accepting religion as one of many types of 
experience, we should expect to find it at least congruous with 
the rest. If these by themselves when analysed and systematised 
do not yield a personal God, no complaint need be made. But it 
must surely be gratifying to the saint to observe that the order 
and beauty which are everywhere revealed by the speolal sciences 
in no way conflict with what the religious experience yields and 
to say the least they are congruous with the idea of God. But 
we really need to go further and admit that the saint's belief 
in the sovereignty of God is ultimately grounded in the sovereign­
ty of the religious experience. Meohanlsm oan subsume chemistry, 
teleology oan subsume both and turn them to its own ends.
Religion oan subsume all others. "All things are yours"; for 
yours is the sovereign experience. Religion is. in the world 
of lower categories but is not of them. Their reality and 
character are not prejudiced by its presence. Religion at the
/same
same time oan make them all Its own. Therein lies the 
sovereignty of the object of religious experience. Herein lies 
a clue to the cosmic responsibility of God. Aooordlng to the 
principle of this thesis, God is the object of the religious 
experience. Roughly speaking, He is then a constituent of the 
Absolute. Is such a conception illogical or irreligious? Not 
if God is in the Absolute as religion oan and should be in human 
experience. God would then be, to use a rough simile, the 
sovereign constituent of the Absolute, its supreme and character­
istic life. This, however, anticipates the conclusion.
MAN.
In man we have the part which, so far as we know, is 
most deeply involved in the Absolute and the supreme or exclusive 
sphere for the operation of religion. It is well to recall here 
the different attitudes presented respectively by religion and 
philosophy. Philosophy is the spectator of all time and exist­
ence. Religion, with its more practical attitude, concentrates 
on the most strategic point in existence and accentuates all that 
pertains to this, the most prominent, nlsus towards the Absolute, 
vis. the human soul. Much, therefore, which philosophy yields 
is not, and is inevitably not, contradictory but is rather irrele­
vant or inapplicable to the immediate religious task. At the sami 
time when the theologian wishes to reach a synoptic view, he must 
recognise much that was Irrelevant or subsidiary to the soul's
ascent to God. The accentuation of the finite nlsus has some-
/times
39.
times amounted to the assumption of a false independence and so
metaphors have been borrowed for the articulation of religious
experience from the world of "claims and counter claims" more to
the detriment than the help of religious thinking. nosanquet
says,"There is no question of 'being in the Absolute1 or not but
only of the mode". The implications of religion substantiate the
former and carry suggestions concerning the latter. Religion is
so deeply oonoerned with the next spiritual Investment that it
frequently fails to reoognlse that all its capital is either a
direct or an indirect Inheritance. Yet that is Implied and the
implication gives the resolution of one of the many paradoxes of
religion. In possibility man is of infinite value: in mere
isolated actuality he is utterly worthless. He starts with only
a possibility. Jesus spoke of the soul not as an endowment but
as an acquisition. "In patience win yourselves souls". It was
in itself a contingency. It could be lost. And the very
possibility was not our creation. It is religious experience
itself that substantiates most fully our "being in the Absolute”.
The goal of the saint's aspiring and the initial unrest that
prompted towards it are one. That is implied in Augustine's
dictum, "Thou hast made us for Thyself and restless are our souls
till they rest in Thee”. The saint is aware that he is "beset
behind and before". Hl8 hope is sustained with the knowledge
/not
1 Footnote. "Value and Destiny", p.130. 
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not only that God Is In His h9aven but that, to quote hie words,
i
"If I make my bed in hell, behold, thou art there." The source 
of the sinner's dlssatisfaotlon Is exactly the same as that of 
the saint's satisfaction. Bven difference from God Involves 
some relation. Herein lies a contrast between the "Pilgrim's 
Progress" and the "Hound of Heaven". The latter makes explicit 
what in the former was at best only Implicit. The pilgrim 
Journeys to a separate God through an alien world. Thompson, 
seeking a finite good, finds he cannot evade the Absolute. The
gold gateways of the stars, the labyrinthine ways of his own mind,
his own nature, the only final satisfaction for him and the Hound 
were obviously one. There was no question of being In the 
Absolute or not. Herein, as In our earlier analysis, we see how 
religion Implies the Absolute. The Object of religious experieno* 
is the Alpha as well as the Omega of that experience. Between 
God and the seeking soul a very real gap seems to exist. But 
Into that gap the soul has only to fling Its own selfish, abstract
self and upon It pass over Into the happiest union with God to
find that all along in deepest reality they were never but one.
The gap was the soul's own refusal both to think so and to live up 
to the implication of suoh a thought. Much In religious testi­
mony which ascribes to God the upholding of the world, the 
Immanence in all being carries great absolutistlo implications 
but these, as pointed out earlier, are not exclusively germain to
/the
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the religious experience and their Import when found there has 
been recognised in a previous chapter (Page^ ). We note at 
present the tacit endorsement religious experience gives to the 
assertion "There is no question of ‘being in the Absolute1 or 
not but only of the mode". We oonslder the question of the 
mode. Thompson when pursued was always and everywhere In the 
Absolute. hut the mode of his inclusion when evading the ’Hound1 
was different from the mode of his inclusion when capitulating to 
the 'Hound1. He was never outwith the Absolute but something of 
the Absolute was not and could not be his till he made his 
oapitulation. And it is that capitulation which is the deepest 
concern of religion. It is a question of mode.
What has led religion to adopt metaphors from the world 
of 'claims and counter-claims' instead of from Absolutism is not 
only that the former provides something simpler to the unreflect­
ing communities to be served but partly also because a greater 
reality is assumed for the self in the former than in the latter 
interpretation of experience. The unreflecting would be satis­
fied on being assured that man at least was not more unreal than 
other objects in the world of empirical fact and would welcome 
the assurance Bradley gives that "The man who demands a reality 
more solid than that of the religious consciousness, seeks he does
i
not know what". But to the reflective religious consciousness 
the mode of man's inclusion in the Absolute depends as much on his
/attitude
"Appearance and Reality", p.449.
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attitude to the whole that anything that diminishes the importance 
of that attitude and of the individual who hears it is looked upon 
with grave suspicion. To speak of mem as merely adjectival would 
seem to involve a confusion if not an error and it could he ques­
tioned if Absolutism necessitated that. bosanquet allows 
individuality only to the Absolute because it alone is all- 
embracing and self-sufficing and on thatassumption one may grant 
that man has not individuality. hut then we would still need a 
term to denote the unique oharaoterisitips of personality. Let it 
be granted that the content of this personal unity is all given in 
universale, nevertheless the sum of such unlversals not so unified 
does not yield a personality. Psychology finds in a crowd some­
thing which no constituent individual, as isolated, brought to it. 
The crowd of relations or unlversals we find in or as constituent 
of a person yields in that unity what the parts in isolation did 
not contain. If it is hard to say what the self would be without 
its content, it is quite as hard to say what the content would be 
without the self. Moreover, for some of the very values which 
are presumed to have a permanence and reality the individual has 
not, flnitude is necessary. hut not only is man spoken of as 
adjectival, appearance seems to be substantlsed. It would he 
better to speak of reality appearing than of appearance and 
reality or the appearance of reality. Certainly the reality that 
so appears is not the whole of reality but that is only saying that 
the part is less than the whole. And so to believe in the reality
/of
of separate elements is not to believe in the separate reality of 
the same. There is no reality isolated from the whole. The 
question oentres in the mode of inclusion. The finite takes its 
flnitude, its content and its nlsus towards the whole from the 
Absolute. It8 presence in the whole oan hardly be interpreted
as antagonism to the whole. "If there is to be a perfect system 
with detail and differentiation" says bosanquet, "there oan be no
l
infinity without finiteness." And "So far as the provisional 
individual is apprehended in its true plaoe and in unity with the 
superior whole, it is or would be real and that so apprehended it 
may fairly be called substantial". hut that is not inevitable. 
"In all volition the finite-infinite or self-transcendant nature 
is in play, but in some volition negates its own infinity by
affirming a partial end against the infinite whole with which the
3.
good self is identified". This must in some way involve differ­
ent modes of inclusion in the Absolute. How can the difference 
be desoribed? Religion would not permit one to speak of the vice 
of finiteness. Are we to convict all unconsolous and inanimate 
things of vice? Moreover we need the word 'vice' for something 
truer to its connotation, vis. the vice not of flniteness but of 
accepting a finite as our real nature, as carrying for us the 
authority of the whole, "a very partial end against the infinite
/whole.
1 "Value and Destiny", p.14.
^ Quoted by Mulrhead in "Mind"19£3, p.407.
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whole". Beoause self-transoendence oan take inodes so divergent 
as to lead to either self-stultlfioation or self-realisation, 
religion throws the weight of Its emphasis there. And religion 
not only does not aocept finitude as a vloe but It also Indicates 
that the "more than finite" tendency in the finite and the fuller 
incorporation of the Absolute does not work towards a loss of 
* detail and differentiation1 or the elimination of mere finitude. 
The most outstanding religious figure is depicted as one who never 
chose a partial end, who in self-transoendence was always "one 
with the Father". Yet finitude as such was no barrier to the 
perfections He came to reveal. The direction He set for the self- 
transcendence of the finite, when followed far enough, would 
certainly lead to what at present is inconceivable but it also 
points to something more than mere escape from finitude. Thus 
religion, except in extreme mysticism, seems to have a more defin­
ite goal for man than Absolutism has. The perfect satisfaction 
according to Absolutism has been described as being in possession 
of the Absolute or being the Absolute. This needs qualification. 
Does any individual really desire the unique privilege of being 
in all the parts or being the logical prius of all things! All 
logical roads from anything lead to the Absolute but the self-
JL
transcendence of the flnltnte in religion is a logical process 
and more: it is towards not the Absolute in general but towards
God, someone within or some aspect of the Absolute. Bosanquet 
says, "I cannot believe that the supreme end of the Absolute is to
45.
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give rise to beings such as I experience myself to be. The self 
at its present level of attainment would certainly seem to be a 
poor object as the supreme end of the Absolute. hut "It doth 
not yet appear what we shall be.” And It Is also difficult to 
think what worlds the Absolute can otherwise seek to realise as a 
supreme end. Can "beauty, truth and love in different renderings 
through different oreated systems” in abstraction from finite 
selves provide an adequately supreme end to the Absolute? Why 
abstract selves from values or values from selves? Moreover,is 
the goal of self-transoendence "to be the Absolute"? If our 
supposedly transplant selves are to be only Instrumental as trivial 
elements in a world of abstracted values, it must be admitted that 
our experience does not point that way. The fuller incorporation 
of the Absolute by the finite self does not lead to any diminishing 
of selfhood or its distinctiveness. Individuality and finitude 
are not inevitable opposites. Self-transoendence, so far as we 
know it, is the upward transition from one level of finitude to 
another not the gradual escape from finitude itself. The incor­
poration of the universal is not the elimination of characterising 
limits but their expansion. They
"Ear from vanish 
Decompose but to recompose."
Bosanquet says, "If I possessed myself entirely I should be the 
Absolute". But the Absolute is the home and realisation of many
/other
l.
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other finites of very different orders. Has not the Absolute 
something of itself distinct for each? Religion at least claims 
that it has. The self-transoendence the saint enjoys points to 
a greater likeness to God within the limits of human finitude.
To the saint any endeavour to be God would be sacrilege and to be 
the Absolute would be meaningless. Thompson in flight wanted
more than the all-embracing Absolute was giving; Thompson in 
capitulation is satisfied with loss than all the Absolute. 
Religion discriminates within the Absolute and accepts for its 
goal what, if the rough metaphor be allowed, may be called the 




Attention has been drawn to the emphasis religion 
plaoes on the human nisus towards the Absolute and on the hazard 
and responsibility involved in the possibility of self- 
transoendence. The problem of freedom is not peculiar to 
religion but religion has its own distinctive contribution to make 
to a solution of it. bosanquet says, "Created spirits are either 
a part of God or they are not; if they are not they cannot be 
completely dependent upon him, if they are they must be determined 
by the whole of which they are parts and oan have no independence 
or freedom". The antithesis here is sharply drawn and the"either 
or" rather rigidly applied. The subject matter is too delicate 
for the Bpatial metaphors employed to express it. In fact, it 
will be found that freedom and determinism do not constitute an 
irreducible antithesis. In order to denote the conatlve activity 
of man either phrase if used must carry considerable qualification. 
If the term 'freedom' be used, it must connote freedom only from 
certain kinds of determinateness and if 'determinism' be used, it 
will mean determinism by a self which cannot be, as we have seen, 
resolved by analysis into a sum of the unlversals that form the 
content of that self. We are not thereby driven to oonclude 
that the home of freedom is a surd' one reason among many for our 
not being so driven is that we do not know the whole content of
/the
the self. Where all the knowable Is not known a surd oannot be 
located. Thus the word "freedom” will be used here, but as 
connoting a specific type of determinateness as constituting a 
new category which, in harmony with previous conclusions, does not 
contradict and annul but subsumes and transcends the lower. 
Bosanquet says, "The basis and character of freedom lay not in 
simple Initiation but in an equipment oapable of extraordinary
l
delicate responses to extraordinarily varied environments"• So 
even though we find in the self a mere assemblage of universale 
with a "thlsness”, we should recognise still that that peculiar 
and rich centre of unified unlversals gives us so unique a type 
of individual*
"That out of three sounds he frame, 
fiot a fourth sound but a star".a 
Thus when that unique individual is in a determination it
enormously differentiates that determination from all lower ones.
The religious act of communion with God Involves a 
willingness in both parties to the act. In that experience the 
self who wills can hardly be described as the disguised mechanism 
of an impersonal Absolute - and the communion itself could not be 
Interpreted as the soliloquy of the Absolute. The acquired and 
dependent reality we have assumed for the self renders such con­
clusions unnecessary. Religion gives also a new aouteness to the 
sense of responsibility. Where is regret or chagrin more
/poignant
1 "Contemporary British Philosophy", p.68.
2 Browning. "Abt Yogler".
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poignant than in the penltenoe of the saint? Yet nothing could 
he more Incongruous than the supposition that the cause of that 
penitence was only the misinterpretation of a natural process. 
Religion gives a new intensity to the paradox between freedom and 
determinism as unqualified and round each half of the paradox has 
gathered a camp of stem dogmatists. Rut religious experience 
offers to some extent a resolution of its own to the paradox. The 
saint often speaks of a volitional incapacity pending the solici­
tation of a spiritual environment. "The good that 1 would I do
i %
not." "Without me ye can do nothing." This real freedom has to
be acquired and acquired from a source that is not spiritually 
neutral. The graoe that enables is not characterless. Man hav­
ing adopted it oannot turn it to any ends merely of his own.
Although grace comes to develops the will, it brings its own
determinateness and any freedom from that would appear as the 
greatest bondage. St. Teresa cries, nO free-will what a miserable 
slave art thou to thy liberty, unless thou art fixed by the love 
and fear of Him who created thee. May He live and give me life; 
may He reign and may I be His captiveI My soul desires no other
S
liberty. How can he be free who is not subject to the Almighty”.
On the higher levels of devotion and ecstasy this graoe may be so
oaptivatlng as to give some justification to the saint's holding 
that he was predestined to the glory which graoe is given to
/promote.
1 Romans 7. v.19.
^ John 15. v.5.
3 "Of Self-Abandonment”.
promote. So long as he speaks thus for himself he offers im­
portant data for the problem under review. Far less Important 
for our purpose is his opinion, if such it be, that others are 
predestined to damnation. That is not given In his experience - 
and when suoh a saint as Cowper says his experience drives him to 
that conclusion, we simply do not believe him. We find mental 
causes for his melancholy.
Thus religious experience shows there"is no question of
our being In the Absolute or not". "If I make my bed In hell,
1
behold, thou art there". The miseries of the far country are due 
to man's being more than finite. There was no famine among the 
merely finite. And He who "stands at the door and knocks" says 
afterwards to those who have given Him entranoe, "Ye have not 
chosen me, but 1 have chosen you." When the saint accepts graoe 
he discovers something that was anterior to his choice - graoe 
seeking and accepting him. "We love Him because He first loved 
us."3
Previous chapters have led us to expect that religion 
would yield and require higher categories than those of lower 
experiences yet also that the former may transcend amd not annul 
the latter. Somehow self-determination must not stand as an 
alien or surd among other forms of determinateness. And It Is 
interesting to note that these do not constitute one undiverslfled
/grade
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grade in sharp distinction from self-determination. There Is 
muoh animal activity that Is closed to mechanical Interpretation.
A broken nerve rebuilds to "a plan that spells the future function? 
let during the time of regeneration the broken nerve is function­
ally useless. L.T.Hobhouse says, "There are grades, probably 
several grades, of conation below explicit purpose". In traoing 
the development of mind he observes that "some qualities of mind 
are biologically too useless and others a great deal too useful to 
be explained by natural selection".1 Thus self-determination is 
not unrelated to the lower forms of determlnateness. Man has 
continuity with nature by this determlnateness which is a charac­
teristic of the whole of reality. Yet this is not saying that 
self-determination is merely the determlnateness of the lower 
order with motive or character as the antecedent determining 
factor. There is no such motive or oharaoter apart from the self. 
Self-determination issues no more from a self-less content than 
from a self abstracted from its content. It 1s from the con­
crete self that the determlnateness known as self-determination 
takes it8 distinctive character. If the self is determined by 
less than that, it is committing evil. Such confessions as 
"I acted from impulse" or "I was beside myself" imply determinate­
ness of the lower order where self-determination should obtain.
The relation between self-determination and the lower 
forms of determlnateness is a subject meriting patient research.
/Here
l
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Here, however, we are dealing with the higher rather than the 
lower limit of self-determination - a limit where are found awe­
some responsibilities and splendid perils* Yet this is quite 
oongruous with the lower limits of self-determination. As the 
self began to reoreate its world, it simultaneously began to 
aoquire thereby its own nature. Far from opposing the self- 
determination of the finite individual the world has given the 
content of that determination. In religion the world is 
reorientated. The saint's intuition and aspiration find and 
enjoy a world of spiritual as well as material reality informing, 
challenging and augmenting his freedom. "The truth shall make
A
you free.” hy faith he has brought himself into the scope of new 
and higher forms of determlnateness. Thus by "an affirmation and 
an aot" he bids eternal truth be present faot. As truly as ever 
before he has nothing but what he has received, yet he has made 
what has been so received his own as nothing else could be.
Here we may well ask, what, in this view, stands in 
jeopardy? Is it freedom? If absolute freedom is meant, yes.
It is jeopardised, and, we trust, refuted* Such freedom is only 
a ohaos of unimaginable possibilities. lo less undesirable as 
well as unreal would be a freedom that oould be free from its con­
tent. There is no freedom that can either aoquire or dispense 
with self-hood. Ve oan find no self abstracted from its content 
neither oan we find a freedom abstracted from the determlnateness
/of
1 John 8. v.32.
of Its content. What Is really desired In freedom Is freedom 
from unworthy determinations. This is precisely the freedom the 
saint desires and claims. He would bring an enormous qualifica­
tion to the term "self in self-determination. Determination 
exclusively by the present actual self is not the freedom for 
which he craves. For what he reoognlses as his true, real self 
is elsewhere, in the hands of God - and where his real self is 
there also is his real freedom. The forms of determlnateness 
from which he seeks freedom include self-determination of the poor 
er type. His real nature is in God and his real freedom is with 
it. So his freedom is God’s blest control.
This does not imply that the individual is jeopardised. 
The content of the self has been transformed in the adoption.
What it is as part of the self it never was prior to tfea adoption. 
One cannot analyse a self into self-less unlversalB. But if the 
real individual is not in jeopardy, the abstract, self-centred 
individual is. The universe is not indifferent to man's choice. 
The bad will is not a particular embodiment of any universe. It 
is an embodied defiance of the only universe. Its volitions 
gradually negate the self. The smallest finite lives by being 
to itself true. Man ultimately and really lives on no other 
terms. "Dunsinnane Wood" represents the universe as it moves 
against the wrongdoer. And were that abstract rebellious Belf 
not in jeopardy the social order would be. The fact that "The
wages of sin is death” is one of the guarantees of the stability
/of
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of the universe. In reality the universe wins immediately every 
time. This, however, calls for further oonsidoration. To some 
even the qualified freedom referred to ahove appears as the thin
edge Of pluralism. It is assumed also that religion requires a
pluralism. The assumption is generally supported hy a too 
literal interpretation of the metaphors used by the exponents of 
religion. hut what the saint immediately peroelves, as we saw 
in an earlier analysis, is an object of awe-inspiring beauty and 
power. "The Lord reigns.” He is omnipotent within the limits 
of His nature and purpose. The saint never cracks the universe 
nor discovers more than one. In the most daring exercise of 
self-determination, viz. prayer, one will alone is recognised as 
supreme. The Saint of saints qualifies His prayers with the 
condition "Hot my will but thine be done". And any prayer of a
saint which really implied that the saint's will not God's should
be done would be straightway Jge counted as blasphemy. As 
potentialities become actuallsed by the saint'fc faith and devotion, 
the universe is enriched without being impaired. Whatever was 
safe before the advent of man, remains safe in his presence and 
will continue so after his departure. hut the universe was not 
necessarily aompletely disclosed or engaged prior to the advent 
of man or to his development into a mature saint. There is no 
reason to doubt that its determinations may engage our relative 
freedom, that "The Immanenoe in the activity of the universe
/becomes
^ Luke 22. v.42.
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>^90 011198 In man an activity that Is free”.
MORALITY.
Although, as we have seen, religion is not identical with 
morality, it claims, especially in its highest expressions, a 
most intimate connection with it. The oonduot of the saint as 
such neither issues from an obedience to a stereotyped law nor 
is it merely an effort towards a moral ideal. It is rather the 
inevitable consequence of loving intercourse between himself and 
God. On a given occasion the outward act of the moralist may be 
precisely the same a3 that of the saint but there would be a vast 
difference between the grounds or the oontextB of their various 
acts in so far as the one kept his morality and the other his 
religion in view. And morality does not stand by itself. The 
"ought" must be related to the "is". The embraoing synthesis is 
deeply involved in any view of God and the Absolute.
The saint in his devotion feels an awe-inspiring 
attraction towards God, yet, exoept in extreme mysticism, never 
is that attraction conceived, as an absorption in which all 
relationship and flnltude are lost. So saint wants to be God. 
Finitude as such is no evil. It is significant that millions of 
Christian saints find a sufficient spiritual ideal in a finite 
embodiment of God, viz. Jesus Christ. The greater appropriation
of God by the saint involves not an elimination but an expansion
/of
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of finite limits. Kven the suggestion of spatial metaphor here 
is misleading. The saint is not completely distinct from yet 
oertainly not identical with God. God is in him and he is in | 
God. Religious experience like morality carries an autonomy and j 
a heteronomy. "By graoe alone" the saint is saved. But that is j 
accepted and appropriated grace, graoe whloh has heen welcomed as 
the content of the real self. There is no significance in our 
wills being God's unless we willed they should be. But for the 
saint, in contradistinction f/r the moralist as such, the heter­
onomy is a theonomy. As the "ought" always implies a possibility,
so the saint'8 progress is always possible. God is sovereign.
1
"Who shall separate us from the love of Christ?" - nothing except 
ourselves. And omnipotence cannot give us spiritual perfection 
in spite of ourselves. But the God who oan Impart that "in spite" 
of everything else
"Bits on no precarious throne 
Nor asks for leave to be".
God cannot be a finite among flnites. Yet the saint yearns to be
like God and speaks of the moral splendours of God. That state­
ment should not be taken too literally. We cannot imagine God 
progressing morally as we do. But we may aocept morality as good­
ness under the form of time. There is for goodness, as for other
things, an identity of principle with most diverse modes of
application and this identity may hold between God and man. God's 
faithfulness in providing the grounds and giving the inspiration
/ for
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for the good life oan be accepted as the expression of a principle j 
not alien to our own life. This faithfulnesses the meaning whichj 
the Old Testament word "righteousness" carries in certain places 
and it is not foreign to one aspect of human goodness. Muoh of 
a good man'8 conduct is the maintenance of a noble character. It 
is the endorsement of previous estimates and attitudes. God's 
ooustant faithfulness in promoting man's spiritual life may be 
accepted as one aspect of His goodness. Whatever moral neutral-
i
ity may in some quarters be attributed to the Absolute, the 
saint, providing he be not a pantheist or an extreme mystic, would 
never attribute such neutrality to God. His own increasing 
god-likeness, far from obliterating the distinction between good 
and evil, has rather deepened it. And experience leads him to 
anticipate that what God is beyond is, not the distinction between 
good and evil as such, but beyond the forms in which we find them 
embodied for our experience here. God is the source of all good­
ness but is the origin of no moral evil. "An enemy hath done
4
this". It is necessary, however, to note that in human experience 
the form and content of a life of spiritual maturity is very 
different from those of a beginner in virtue's ways. Consequently 
goodness in God, however identical in principle with our own, must 
often in unimaginable ways transcend the forms which embody it in 
our experience. Moreover, to be the unchanging ground which makefl 
our own spiritual progress possible must be forever different from
/being
1 Matt.13. t .28.
being a unit in and through whloh the progress takes place. Here 
as elsewhere, anthropomorphism is inevitable. But its limits 
should as far as possible be deteoted and acknowledged.
On the other hand some types of thought whloh postulate 
an Absolute "beyond good and evil" do not thereby attribute a 
sheer neutrality to the Absolute. If in the good form of self- 
transoendenoe the finite individual incorporates more of the 
Absolute and in the evil form, less, the Absolute is not indiffer­
ent to or equally receptive of both. The more the finite '■
i
individual fulfils the purpose of the whole, the better he is.
His good act is a partioularlsation of a universal. An evil act 
is never that. It has no universe of its own. "Whether anything 
is better or worse does undoubtedly make a difference to the
Absolute. And certainly the better anything is, the less totally
1
in the end is its being overruled", says Bradley, who also de­
clares, "Evil is transmuted and, as such, is destroyed, while the
o
good in various degrees oan still preserve its oharaoter". The 
difficulty here is partly a problem of terms. While admitting 
that the Absolute must be beyond good and evil as we know them, 
we need to define that characteristic of the Absolute by virtue 
of whloh it endorses and subsumes the goodness of the finite 
individual in a way in whloh it does not subsume much less endorse 
the evil of perhaps the same person. In other words, we need to 
describe how the supra-moral differs from the non-moral. For
/although
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although it is the permanent ground and we the ohanglng units, 
although it is the self-giver and we have nothing that we have 
not received, we oan still recognise a moral kinship seeing that 
our good is a greater acceptance of the Absolute and our evil is 
the rejection of that for some narrow selfish interest. Moreover, 
although the older type of religious dogma may have attributed 
a great measure of reality to evil, the direct utterances of faith, 
while describing sufficiently the evil of sin, never attributed to 
it reality in the highest sense of the term. Sin is not obedience 
to the law of an order of reality antagonistic to the good. "Sin
A
is the transgression of the law". The New Testament words for 
sin are negative terms, vis."harmatia", missing the mark, "anomia", 
lawlessness, "parabasis", an overstepping, "paraptoma", a falling 
beside. A man's evil deed is really a consecration to a negation. 
It does not crack the universe but gradually drives him from it. 
While this implies a reality and system for goodness evil has not, 
the choice of the latter by the individual is a dreadfully
significant thing for him. What really is the significance of
this?
The conception of the self the religious experience 
implied seems to prevent the resolution of the self merely into 
its relatedness. In like manner the same experience in its moral
expressions makes the resolution, say, of a bad will to be a
greater matter than the redistribution of its constituents. For
/the
1 John 3. v.4.
60.
the moral judgment la never passed on the content of the will 
In abstraction from the will or s^lf and could not be, e.g. 
self-preservation may be good or bad according to the concrete 
situation in whloh it Is possible and that situation centres in 
the finite Individual. As It Is only through the consciousness 
and volition of a self that a natural fact passes Into a spirit­
ual one so the possible contents of a will prior to their adopt­
ion by the will are neither good nor bad morally. Consequently 
any redistribution of the contents of the will In abstraction 
from the oonorete will would not resolve the evil Into good.
While this conception of the moral life deepens the problem of
the self. It lightens somewhat the problem of evil. Sven \
Theism does not always appropriate the advantage gained thereby. 
Professor Galloway says, "We shall be told that to say that a
heing who permits moral evil and does not prevent an evil He |
could have prevented Is in no way responsible for It, savours
■A
more of sophistry than of common candour”. "In the end no
doubt God must have a certain indirect responsibility for moral 
evil." With reference to the former statement, it must be ad­
mitted that God could not have prevented evil and still made 
moral goodness possible. If man Is to be more than a non-moral 
being he must take with the chances of being a saint the risks 
of being a rake. It is impossible on the view of the self 
given above to deny that man has real responsibility In moral
/choices
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choices and, in so far as he has, complete responsibility cannot 
be attributed to God. Instead of charging God with "a certain 
indirect responsibility for moral evil", it would be better to 
acknowledge His direct and full responsibility for the possibility 
of moral good and evil. The problem for Theism is not to prove 
that an assumed bad world and a good God are compatible for more 
than God is Involved in a morally bad world. The problem is to 
justify the evolution of the natural into a moral order. for 
the advent of man marked the moral adolescence of the world.
The self, then, with its dependent reality ever seeks 
self-transcendence. It oan increasingly accept the purpose of 
the whole whloh carries the content of its real self or choosing , 
some false ideal gradually work towards self-stultification 
instead of self-realisation. In this life neither process seems
to reach a final termination. Ve ask if life is continued beyond!
the grave and so approach the next chapter.
IMMOBTALITY.
Immortality constitutes a problem that is not exclusive­
ly nor even necessarily religious. "This world" and "the other 
world" in correct religious terminology are not divided by the 
narrow stream of death. They are both on this side of it and may 
overlap it. bosanquet advises us to look for lifef8 extension in 
a "lateral" rather than a "linear" direction. The transformation 
and expansion religion brings does not exactly take either
/direction
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direotion and any spatial metaphor would somewhat oonoeal or 
obsoure the true Inwardness of the experience. The emphasis of 
religion is not on immortality but on eternal life and the con­
notation of the latter term is primarily one of value. Duration 
comes in by way of implication. There may be a conception of 
immortality that is almost or entirely bereft of eternal life, 
e.g. some ancient animistic and necromantic religions with their 
survival beliefs. The objective of spiritualism is more a 
matter for science than for religion. Religion no more gives 
prolongation to mortal life than it gives success to merely moral 
life. Mortality and morality are swallowed up of life. On the 
other hand the saints of Israel for centuries enjoyed eternal 
life without, at least, any clear conception of immortality.
They experienced an "other” life which was life in God here and 
now. The earliest conception of immortality Israel had was only
a pagan borrowing from other lands. Sheol was a place beyond
w
Yahmeh's jurisdiction and it offered to man only a shadowy exist­
ence void of all moral distinctions and religious joy. It is 
thus clear from Israeli experience that on a certain level of 
intellectual and religious achievement there oan be a vigorous 
spiritual life without belief in immortality and there oan be an 
immortality for which religion has no use. This negative 
attitude, however, carried positive suggestions. The raoe, not 
the individual, was the unit with which God was supposed to be 
dealing and it would last as long as God's purposes required. As
/the
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the conception of personality developed, as it was seen that God
had a purpose for the individual as suoh, immortality became part
of Israel1s faith. The earlier faith without immortality was
cuite consistent with the later faith with it. The view of
eternal life in its essentials was one in both stages. In like
manner the teaching of the Sew Testament lays little or no
a
emphasis on immortality as suoh. It is concerned primarily with 
the creation and augmentation of values as realised in men and 
women and the only duration it is Interested in is the duration 
those values require. It offers no proof of natural immortality 
but gives expressions and guarantees of eternal life. Its 
teaching 1m no way suggests that immortality is given to any kind
of life for any purpose. "He that doeth the will of God abideth
2,
for ever."
Professor E.S.Brightman says, "One's attitude towards 
immortality is fundamentally determined by one’s world view and 
not by this or that particular faot". For the next world and 
this are within one universe and the most comprehensive and uni­
fied knowledge of this is the safest guide we can have to that. 
What is true of this, the philosophic, attitude is also true of 
the religious attitude. Israel's belief in immortality grew 
pari passu with its view of God and the world. Some account
/has
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in a paper that limits the data under survey to the 
religious experience of the saints.
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has already been given of the world view implied in the developed 
religious experience. We may now elicit its implications for 
immortality.
This subject has undoubtedly been "siokled oer" with 
rhetorical Imagery and homlleotloal Inducements. But the dear­
est argument against any literal acceptance of suoh descriptions 
of immortality is the lives of the saints themselves. For many 
have abandoned secular heavens without a whimper and consigned 
themselves to hells on earth without regret. They desire an 
immortality
"Hot for the sake of gaining heaven 
Nor of escaping hell".
Religion brings a life and a death of its own - a life that did
not issue merely from "this life" and a death that oan take place
while "this life" continues. It is quite possible then that its
life may oontlnue after "this death". Ishi, the oonverted
Japanese criminal, writing within a month of his execution, says,
"The problem of this world's life and death never occurs to me
now. The only thing that oonoerns me is the life and death of
1
the soul". In the relationship between the saint and God there 
is a personal warmth that is absent from the relationship between 
the philosopher as suoh and the Absolute. In the higher 
religions, God is conceived as being full of benignant love for 
His saint8 and craving their voluntary fellowship. It is 
difficult for the saint to find any reason why God should be
/satisfied
^ "A Gentleman in Prison", p.118.
satisfied to terminate abruptly that relation in the physical 
event known as death. Augustine says, "Never would God have 
done suoh and so great things for us, if with the death of the 
body, the life of the soul came to an end". The saint, although 
admitting the agnosticism inevitable here concerning this subject, 
will still feel that his experience entitles him to a limited but 
sufficient affirmation.
"I know not where His islands lift 
Their fronded palms in air.
1 only know I cannot drift 
Beyond His love and oare."
The saint as suoh does not orave for any mere extension of life
A
beyond the grave. "Thy lovingkindness is better than life."
He seeks not more mere duration but more of God. That oravlng 
is never finally satisfied, neither are the possibilities of his 
fellowship with God exhausted on this side of the grave. So 
great do those possibilities appear to be that the self may 
experience inconceivable transformations without ceasing to be the 
self. Yet the self in abstraction hereafter would be as empty 
as it would be here. While it is not to be merely identified 
with its content, it is as nothing apart from it. This must hold 
true of any anticipated future life as it does of this life.
"Whom have I in heaven but thee and there is none on earth that I 
desire beside thee."^
Here we note that the saint has no speolal evidence of 
the future life as such. His distinctive contribution is the
/anticipation
^ Psalm 63. v.3. 
^Psalm 73. v.25.
anticipation that has its grounds in his own unique experience. 
There are naturally other antioipations grounded in different 
experiences and philosophy alone can finally adjudicate between 
these. But we note with regard to the hereafter as with regard 
to the present life God seems to allow to the individual a measure 
of distinctness that the Absolute as portrayed in ordinary 
absolutism does not. At the same time, in its reference to some 
vital aspects of this question, absolutism is somewhat indefinite. 
It really gives no answer to the question, "If a man die shall he 
live again?? If the self is only adjectival, a temporary 
embodiment of eternal values, it does not follow from that alone 
that the values dispense with their embodiment at the moment of 
death. If our end is to be the Absolute, it may be that the 
grave does not bring us abruptly to that end. One oan hardly 
think that the physical event known as death will strip us of our 
finltude. Even though the assumptions of absolutism on this 
point were granted, it would still be possible to hold that if a 
man die, he might live again. Moreover, Bosanquet says that 
"While we serve as units, to speak the language of appearance, 
the Absolute lives in us a little and for a little time: when
its life demands our exlstenoe no longer, we yet blend with it
as the pervading features or characteristics whloh we were needed
±
for a passing moment to emphasise". Suoh a conception oould sug­
gest no definite time when the Absolute would demand our existence
/no
^Aristotelian Proceedings 1917-1918. p.506.
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no longer. The early deaths of some geniuses and saints do 
suggest that the Absolute oould oontinue to emphasise or oould 
emphasise more fully certain characteristics were these geniuses~ 
to continue to live elsewhere. And hosanquet's contention does 
not make untenable the Absolute's demanding their existence in 
other spheres. Absolutism does not preclude the possibility of 
post-mortem life. On the other hand the anticipations of reli­
gion should be marked by great caution. If Absolutism means by 
our blending with the Absolute hereafter nothing more than a 
much richer involution in the Absolute of the same kind as we ex­
perience here, religion oould offer nothing to the contrary. 
Moreover the self may be capable of transformations utterly in­
conceivable to us at present. It may be that the ultimate con­
dition of the self is one in whloh a man would not recognise 
himself without having first experienced all the intermediate 
stages between his present condition and that ultimate one. The 
only position in whloh he oould appreciate the last stage of self- 
transcendence would be the penultimate stage of the same trans­
cendence. Scripture grants a limited and temporary agnosticism
i
here. "It doth not yet appear what we shall be." Ve gain our 
insights as we approach our objective. Yet neoessary, therefore, 
though great caution bev there seem to be two stipulations human 
experience oan now lay down concerning the ultimate end or con­
dition of the self. It must be self-accepted. A man would fall,
/perhaps
1 1 John 3. v.2.
60.
perhaps, at present to identify himself in his ultimate con­
dition hut that would not refute the fact that therein lay his 
truest and fullest self. Nevertheless, if in his penultimate 
stage of transcendence he oould not then recognise and accept 
that condition as being his best, it oould not be the best for 
him. 3o far as this goes there may be ahead a wonderfully 
intimate union between God and the individual wherein at present 
we should think the individual was lost. But our present judg­
ment on this matter is not finally authoritative even for our­
selves. On the other hand as this world and the next must be in 
one universe, experience here must lend some clue to experience 
hereafter. The process of self-transcendence here will indicate 
the direction of future self-transoendenoe. So the Christian 
saint relieves his agnosticism on this point. "It doth not yet 
appear what we shall be; but we know that, when he shall appear, 
we shall be like him."
In the saint's conception of immortality we see among 
other ideas the logical consequenoes of his conception of the 
self. If we hold with regard to the future life what we held 
with regard to the present life, viz. that we must not abstract 
selves from values or values from selves, we see that there are 
excluded the ideas of impersonal immortality and merely natural 
or self-centred and atomistic immortality. No "choir invisible” 
nor value Impersonal oan fulfil the promise of the saint's life
/here
* 1 John 3. v.2.
here. A heaven of values abstracted from all finite selves 
seems at least incongruous with this world where selves are so 
deeply involved and to many it would appear as muoh poorer than 
anything we know here. We cannot conceive of a world of ab­
stracted values whloh oould be counted as the consummation of this 
world. And selves do not live again in the "Choir invisible".
The immortalisation of influence sacrifices all the selves of pre­
vious ages to the living of today. And so the last generation 
of human beings would have to justify the travail and sacrifice of 
all previous generations - and then Itself pass away. All this 
seems incongruous with the positions we sought to establish con­
cerning the self on pages (&H4. As equally impossible is it to 
establish on the grounds of experience here any hope of a self- 
centred and atomistic immortality. Suoh a conception is quite 
irreligious. Hereafter as well as here the saint admits 
"What is op being but for Thee?"
And in no world, according to religion, is the soul apart from 
God anything more than a worthless and abstract object. If against 
this the protest be raised that such a conception Involves con­
ditional immortality, it oould be replied, as only one of many 
ways of replying, that that immortality is no more conditional 
than life here is. And does the self really want or oould God 
really endure an unconditional immortality for any kind of beingl 
It may sound strange to suggest that man's tenure of existence is 
an acquisition. Can a man be mortal one day and by an hour of
/glorious
glorious life beoome immortal the next? hut the same kind of 
difficulty comes with equal force to those who contend for natural 
immortality. If a man is naturally immortal, is he so only an 
hour after birth? If so, is he immortal an hour before birth?
And if so, oan we deny immortality to a devoted and faithful dog? 
But the phrase "natural immortality” itself raises a suspicion, 
lhat is characteristically human is just what transoends the mere­
ly natural order in man. Thus, often the argument for natural 
immortality asserts that the mortalities of the physical world 
should not perturb man for he is more than a member of it. In 
other words natural immortality is defended by reference to the 
spiritual qualities in man. But that is just the realm where con­
tingency oreeps in or natural inevitability is transcended. For 
the sake of illustration we adduce what to us oan be only hypo­
thetical, vis. the case of the finally worthless and impenitent.
Is it not a false gratuity to call such a man? Is he not a being 
who has lost his manhood? Can the doctrine of the natural immor­
tality of man refer to such? Is there any conceivable reason for 
the Immortality of such? Sndless punishment merely for punish- 
meat's sake is incongruous with the Christian*, as well as many 
other,, conceptions,of God, The hypothetical case is beyond re­
demption. Ho saving purpose oan be effected by longer life. In 
philosophic phraseology we oan speak of such a being as being out- 
with the purpose of the universe, sundered from the Absolute.
This is a test case. Professor Pringle Pattison says, "Suoh
/absolute
absolute freedom is an abstraotion of the intellect and the final 
determination to evil is inconsistent with what we believe of the 
omnipotence of love and the constraining power of goodness".
This indicates the aouteness of the problem. In spite of the 
difficulty this brings, Professor Mackintosh still clings to 
natural immortality without resorting to universal restoration as 
Pringle Pattison tentatively does in the statement given above. 
Professor Mackintosh declares that "To say that God cannot toler­
ate to all eternity a dead limb in a redeemed universe is undeni- 
ably to assert future punishment of the direst kind". To many it 
would appear the greatest mercy to all concerned that suoh should 
become extinct. Suffice it to point out that we are here in a 
region where experience and even language fall us. The finally 
impenitent is dead so far as the universe of order is oonoerned. 
Lawlessness has become his law; self, his God. Whether that
means total extinction it is difficult to say. We oan only admit
that the finally impenitent is a hypothetical case and, were there 
such, their Immortal existence would be exceedingly Irrational.
The difficulties of this view are relieved by the accept­
ance of the doctrine of Universal Restoration. Those holding 
this doctrine oan easily aooept conditional immortality because 
they assume all will fulfil the required conditions. Professor 
Pringle Pattison in his oareful treatment of the subject says, "So 
long as any good at all remains in a nature, it is accessible to
/the
^ "The Idea of Immortality". p.202.
% "Immortality and the Future", p.221.
the spirit of God". But he adds, "And the little leaven must
1
work till it leavens the whole lump". The necessity for this is 
not olear. In fact he suggests elsewhere that it is dubious, e.g. 
"Nothing seems more fatally easy than the dissolution in this 
fashion of the coherent unity we call the mind, if the process is 
allowed to continue and to spread. We oan observe the phenomena 
frequently in the case of disease when it affects the practical 
activities of life; but the mere relaxation of the moral effort 
may initiate the same process in the spiritual sphere." This 
possibility receives great emphasis from the religious conscious­
ness. Any veiled compulsion which would neutralise suoh a 
possibility would vitiate the universal restoration and make it 
very muoh poorer in spiritual qualities than the possibly smaller 
but freely willed heaven. On the other hand instead of the asser­
tion that none oan finally refuse their eternal good it is said 
that none will do so. The prediction may be true. One cannot 
estimate what the light of other worlds will reveal and what 
spiritual changes that revelation will produce. But there are 
some considerations which rob that prediction of dogmatic certain­
ty. It cannot be asserted authoritatively that fuller light will 
inevitably bring the desired change. It does not always do so 
here. Moreover spiritual life hereafter for man cannot be differ­
ent in prinoiple from what it is here. It is gratuitous to pre­
sume that he who rejeots the best spiritual life here will be
/subdued
inIdea of Immortality". p.£04. 
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subdued and won by that hereafter. "If they hear not Moses and 
the Prophets neither will they be persuaded though one rose from 
the dead."4"
It is asserted that the reputation of God depends upon 
a universal restoration. God has failed, we are told, if one 
soul is lost. But oan even omnipotent love command a spiritual 
result? Is Bivine Love responsible for the rejections that it
|
meets? There is beneath such contentions an underlying j
assumption that needs criticism. What is it that would finally
i
reject the purpose and love of God? We must avoid the conception 
of a ready-made, self-contained, finite being. The possibility
i
of the self is given: its content has to be acquired. The real j
oontent of the self has to be found in the service and life of 
God. When these are evaded, the self remains a mere but pervert- | 
ed possibility. An earthly father oan feel little affeotlon for 
the embryo of his future child. Weither for its own sake nor for 1 
his could he wish it three score years and ten, if at its birth 
its development were finally arrested. Whatever may be the 
physical and mental developments of man, if his life since adoles­
cence has been one of greed and vice, he is still merely a spirit­
ual embryo threatened with a spiritually prenatal death. If his 
real self is never acquired and the mere possibility of the soul 
is taken to that
"Sequestered state 
Where God unmakes but to remake the soul 
He else made first in vain” ,
/we
1 Luke 16. v.31.
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we cannot say God ha3 failed: He Has not finished His work.
A religious interpretation is here given to the self.
There are others and when they are adopted the problem becomes
more acute. Universal Eestoration seems appropriate to Professor
Pringle Pattison "wherever a real self has come into being were
1
it only through rebellion and actual sin". Professor Mackintosh
also says, "Character in the worst man alive has in it a spiritual
force for which unending activities are not too great a field"?
These statements give to the evil or abstract self a reality and
duration the facts of experience do not warrant. A real self
may be attained in spite of a temporary rebellion and sin and the
worst character, if converted, may carry a potential eternity.
hut the self-destructiveness of the sinful life cannot be doubted
and the immortal existence of a character directly and completely
antagonistic to the Divine will sounds, to say the least, highly
speculative. Professor Galloway says, "After all what man needs
is an ethical and spiritual self-fulfilment not mere persistence
of a metaphysical identity”. Former chapters based on an
analysis of the religious experience have led us to conclude that
the true self is an acquisition to be found only in God* Hot by
any psyohio-developments due to mere self-assertion has it risen
to the status of a real and immortal self. Such independence is
neither religious nor congruous with a spiritual universe. Where
/the
1 "The Idea of Immortality", p.204.
^"Immortality and the Future", p.225.
3’"Ihe Idea of Immortality", p.127.
,the self's content is there also is its immortality, viz. in 
God. "because I live ye shall live also."
If these conclusions he endorsed, the initial unity 
is presented as enriched hut not weakened by the enrichment.
The Absolute is still Absolute and God, God. Contingency centres 
only in the self. Values are still values, although some men may 
despise them and the universe still stands, although some men may 
defy it. The sovereignty of God is as manifest in Hell as in
Heaven. It is man's attitude to it that makes man's misery or
bliss.
* John 14. v.19.
CONCLUSION.
Having analysed the religious experience and examined 
its most intimate contacts with philosophy, we are in a position 
to define somewhat the terms used hitherto rather loosely, viz.
God and the Absolute. We have accepted God as the object of the 
religious experience and in the few references made herein to 
theology, have, for convenience sake, defined it as the science 
of that objeot. In actual fact it often implies much more or 
much less. It sometimes assumes the prerogatives of philosophy, 
fiev. E.ul.Helton, L.L. says, "What we must contend for is the 
existence of a distinct Christian philosophy in rivalry, if you 
will, to other systems and one which must stand or fall on its
own merits and its own intrinsic worth as the best solution of
±
the problems which beset human thought". Therein the most 
significant part yet really only a part would presume to be the 
whole. The highest categories there instead of subsuming would 
annul the lower. God would supplant the Absolute. On the other 
hand theology has at times sought a standing in the missing links 
of other sciences. The inability of the sciences also to say why 
things are what they arshin spite of their wondrous unfolding of 
how things are,such,has been taken as the opportunity for theology 
especially apologetics. Hut theology should not be accepted as 
a science of gaps. It should deal not with assumed holes in the 
natural order but with the positive content of a spiritual
/experience
i
"King's College Lectures on Immortality", p.228.
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experience. The Godhead is not a cosmic monastery isolated from 
other areas of reality. God is not spatially in the .Absolute in 
the sense of being in it but not of it.
Granting that theology as defined in this thesis is 
aocepted, it presents unique difficulties to philosophy. The 
emergence into any settled unity of something higher than anything 
hitherto ascertained threatens the unity and attracts critical 
analysis. It should not be surprising that religion which pro­
motes the transcendenoe of the finite self cracks and overlaps 
the neat and precise categories and systems of the lower realms 
of existence. Thus between God and the saint there seems to be 
a greater distinctness and yet a closer intimaoy and oneness than 
there are between the Absolute and what may be called the sub­
human parts. Here lies the crux of the problem in freedom, 
morality and immortality. Religious terminology undoubtedly 
needs a violent purging. Aut, when that is done, analysis and 
synthesis will reveal that religious thought constitutes a dis­
tinct sphere of reference requiring terms and categories of its 
own. Philosophy must subsume that in its all-comprehensive 
unity. This will not mean converting the term "Absolute" fhto 
a philosophical synonym for God nor interpreting the term 
"Absolute" as the unity of the sub-human order with God as a 
aupra-absolute. We have endeavoured to prove that the granting 
of a measure of reality to the concrete self is not incongruous I
/with /
/ I/ i
with belief in the Absolute. Suoh a self merely augments the 
rioh diversities within the Absolute by making the possible actual. 
No part of the universe is Jeopardised by the qualified freedom 
we have assumed man has. The purpose of the whole is always 
triumphant. Man oan determine, not whether it shall succeed or 
not but whether he shall share in its success or not and so attain 
or miss respectively his own self-realisation. And as man de­
rives his uniqueness and worth only from the whole, so is it only 
as we see God in the Absolute that ontological validity oan be 
found for any belief in God. Theology is only one of the many 
sciences all dealing with reality. Philosophy is one. "A 
Christian Philosophy" is a dubious phrase. If the adoption of 
the religious epithet means the exclusion of anti-Christlan 
elements then that oan only imply that the work of philosophy is 
not finished. There are still antitheses to be resolved into a
fuller thesis. If the epithet merely involves the exclusion of
non-religious elements of reality then whatever system of thought 
may be built upon that narrow basis, it certainly cannot be called 
philosophy. What is thereby excluded has its ground in the 
Absolute. Por to lack direot religious value is not to lack 
ontological validity. So there is much in the Absolute for which 
religion has no direot or praotioal use. This involves in one 
sense that the Absolute is more than God Just as life is more than 
religion. If this were all that was meant by the statement that 
God is an "appearance of reality” no question could be raised.
/Better
setter, however, would it he to say that God is reality appearing* 
making itself known and in this conneotion, making itaelf known 
in unique ways and for what, at lea3t at present, are the highest 
purposes. God, then, to speak the language of philosophy, is 
the nisus of the Absolute towards man, that which appeals to us 
and endeavours to draw us religiously towards the whole. This 
would imply a qualification of a statement referred to in a pre­
vious chapter. It is said that God who identifies Himself with 
one side of the struggle between good and evil cannot be the 
Absolute which embraces both. That is true. But God should 
never be presented as taking part in a cosmic duel. He is that 
which elicits our upward self-transcendence. He struggles
against nothing in the Absolute. He is opposed to our acceptance 
of false Absolutes. There is no moral evil, so far as we know,
outwith the will of the finite self and in so muoh as the Absolute
grants self-realisation as the consummation of only one form of 
self-transcendence, it by that very necessity opposes all other 
forms of self-transcendence which negate rather than enrich the 
true self. In that sense the Absolute is against evil. But
evil is not absorbed in the Absolute in spite of man or apart from
man. In a sense evil never was and never oan be in the Absolute. 
It would be truer to say that in so far as man is evil, he is 
outwith the Absolute. God, then, is not a finite among finites, 
a super-finite, a superior monad existing apart from other finite 
monads and related to them only in some inconceivable way. Neither
80.
is it true to say that God is the Absolute only viewed religious­
ly, as if the difference was only one of a finite point of view 
or of terminology. Whatever is distinct in the apprehension of 
the saint in a moment of religious exaltation is only data for 
reflection and not a closure on reflection. It would be 
confusing, to say the least, to think of the Absolute as a bare 
empty neutral, a characterless unity, into which differences of 
content were imported by our different methods of approach. We 
must think of the Absolute as the ultimate ground of the rich 
diversified oontent of our eaqperienoe, the religious experience 
included. Each approach discovers something distinct in reality. 
G.D.Broad in an essay in which he argues against belief In a 
personal God admits the probability of the above contention being 
true. ”1 think it more likely than not", he writes, "that in
A .
religious and mystical experience men come into cont^ot with some
Reality or some aspect of Reality whloh they do not come into
1
contact with in any other way". To some thinkers that is one of 
the very reasons why they resent resolving God into something 
impersonal. The inadequacy of the term "personal” has been ad­
mitted. hut the whole inadequacy lay in the fact that what was 
wanted was a term connoting not less but more than that. No 
saint would ever agree that his faith was oentred in an abstract 
content, an empty unity or a sum total of self-less values. The 
objeot of his faith is rather something whloh is more of what we
/know
1 "Belief in a Personal God". Hibbert Journal
Oct. 1925. p.47.
■know here, an experience which is also the ground of all our 
fragmentary experiences. Lord Haldane says, "It is just in 
those higher aspeots of self-consciousness in whioh the know­
ledge and volition of selves display more and more of identity 
and less and less of difference whioh is the characteristic of 
the external world that the search for the foundation of finite
A
self-hood seems fruitful".
Undoubtedly there is in actual theology much that is 
contrary to what is given above. But that does not militate 
against the aim of this thesis. It has been contended herein 
that while religious experience oan fill all others without 
negating any, it is after all but one among the many. If its 
approach to reality elicits something distinct from what all other 
approaches elicit, as we believe it does, it should not therefore 
be suspected. That is a result rather to be expected. Never­
theless the immediate utterances of religious faith should be 
subjected to the same logical analysis as the deliverances of 
other experiences are. This is imperative if ontological valid­
ity is claimed for the saint’s belief in God. Theh.it will be 
asked, is that unique reality or a3peot of reality to whioh reli- 
{ gion has the exclusive approach.but one reality or aspect of 
reality within the all-embracing Absolute? This is really the 
crux of the whole question and here precisely all terms and 
metaphors are most Inadequate. The safest course is to let our
/Analysis
* "Aristotelian Proceedings" 1917-18. p.581.
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analysis of the religious experience give us not a conclusion hut 
a clue. The categories whioh seem most adequate and germain to 
the religious experience do not cancel hut subsume the lower ones. 
In a somewhat analogous way should not the oonnotation of the 
term "God" he something whioh does not contradict hut augments 
the oonnotation of the terms denoting realities or aspects of 
reality whioh are the objects of other approaches? If, in 
objection, it he asked if God is only a part of the Absolute, 
the answer may he given, "Yes in the way that religion in the 
greatest possible saint is only part of his entire life". As a 
matter of hypothesis, there may he for finite individuals a 
relationship to the Absolute higher than the religious one and an 
aspect or a constituent of the Absolute higher than God as we now 
know Him. hut suoh flights must he abandoned. Aotual experience 
is sufficient to engage all our attention. In examining that 
experience we have observed that in the highest forms of saint­
liness justice is done to all aspects of life yet all are filled 
with religious emotion and motive. Is it derogatory to religion 
to think that God so fills the whole of ultimate reality? This 
seems to he the conclusion to whloh the religious experience 
points. Is God sovereign? Yes, as the sovereign aspeot or 
life of the Absolute. Is He Lord of all? Yea, religiously so. 
By as much as the saint's best possible religious experience 
would be over all and in a sense would fill all otherq, so can 
we hold that the object of that experience stands in the same
/relation
relation to the objects of other experiences. Is God, then, 
only part of the Absolute? This again is like asking if 
religious experience is part of one's total experience. The 
answer is, "It is only part in so far as the reality of other 
experiences is not questioned or jeopardised. It is however 
not a part external to the others but the informing and vivifying 
immanence in them all".
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